INTRODUCTION
To protect speech, the Court forsakes integrity in government. This has been the trend in campaign finance cases, beginning with Buckley v. Valeo 1 and becoming notorious in Citizens United 2 : laws that shield us from corruption concede to the First Amendment right of political association. 3 Can an incumbent demand that her constituents pay tribute in return for having their concerns heard? Can a company purchase the advocacy of an incumbent? Thus far, scholars have asserted that Citizens United applies only in the campaign context, such that the First Amendment protects campaign financing but not bribery or extortion. 4 ever, Citizens United may have force outside the campaignfinancing context-there may be a constitutional right to corrupt your politician.
In McDonnell, the Supreme Court attempted to draw the line between criminal corruption and permissible constituent service. 6 The case involved the Governor of Virginia who, in exchange for hundreds of thousands of dollars' worth of gifts and loans, used his position as the governor to champion a dietary supplement. 7 The jury found the Governor guilty of taking a bribe 8 under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, but the Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that sale of influence alone was not punishable. 9 This holding prompted varying responses. Some asserted that the Court's holding "opens the door to a corrupt 'pay to play' culture" and the "selling [of] office for personal gain." 10 Others asserted that the Court simply rejected "novel prosecution theories that convert traditional constituent services into federal crimes." 11 As a preliminary matter, however, one ought to consider whether we should be concerned about the selling of influence, favor, and advocacy at all. Most would characterize such sales as corruption. 13 Yet some empirical studies suggest corruption is neither prevalent in, nor harmful to, the United States. 14 One ought to reject this conclusion for two reasons. First, political scientists have long cautioned that corruption can transform a representative democracy into a tyranny. 15 Congress appreciated this threat and so enacted statutes to prevent corruption of public office. 16 In fact, a number of studies substantiate these fears, finding significant and detrimental effect of money on politics. 17 Second, corruption harms public trust in government. 18 As of 2015, 75% of Americans perceived corruption as widespread on Capitol Hill. 19 This distrust in the U.S. political system was also evident in the 2016 election. 20 Ac- 13 See, e.g., Telink, Inc. v. United States, 24 F.3d 42, 43 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that the prosecution listed "influence peddling" among allegedly corrupt acts); Seropian v. Forman, 652 So. 2d 490, 502 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995) (Stone, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Accusing a government official of influence peddling is arguably the equivalent of a charge of corruption."). See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (C. 350 B.C.E.), reprinted in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1986, 2068 (Jonathan Barnes, ed. 2014) ("When the magistrates are insolent and grasping they conspire against one another and also against the constitution from which they derive their power, making their gains either at the expense of individuals or of the public."); accord BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS 56, 79, 105, 139-40 (Vintage, 1970) (noting that the founding fathers saw corruption as a threat to liberty). 16 See CONG. GLOBE, 32d Cong., 2d Sess. 242 (1853) (explaining that 10 Stat. 170 was enacted to preserve the honor of offices and the "character of the Government"). 17 Cf. Michael M. Franz, Addressing Conservatives and (Mis)using Social Science in the Debate over Campaign Finance, 51 TULSA L. REV. 359, 369 (2016) (listing the findings of various studies and noting that these studies tend to disagree on whether money actually influences politics). 21 Being concerned with corruption does not mean, however, that we ought to conduct a witch-hunt to root out every appearance of corruption. Whereas under-regulation can cause social discord, 22 overzealous regulation can freeze the government and harm the economy. 23 State and federal governments must neither over-regulate nor under-regulate. This Note will not, however, attempt to determine the optimal level of regulation or expound on the dangers of corruption. 24 It suffices to say that our anti-corruption laws must be carefully studied and discussed. 25 Rather, this Note focuses on the interaction between the U.S. anti-corruption framework and Constitutional Law. Specifically, this Note investigates whether recent Supreme Court cases created a constitutional right to engage in some form of corruption. press and discourse as shields against "the ambition or avarice of any great man" and "the jaws of power").
In Part II, the Note explores the question of whether the Governor engaged in any corruption at all. Here, the Note finds that the McDonnell Court adopted a definition of corruption identical to that established in Citizens United and McCutcheon. Under this definition, the Governor was not corrupt. The Note contends that this definition may extend First Amendment protection to the sale of political influence and favor, "rules-free policymaking and electioneering." 26 Finally, Part III of the Note explores whether the First Amendment can be used as a defense to bribery or other corruption charges. The Note finds that such use of the First Amendment is possible, but that doctrines developed in the U.S. Courts of Appeals decrease the likelihood of success. Thus, the Note concludes that it may be your constitutional right to pay for your governor's influence, favor, and advocacy. Just make sure you are prepared to fight to the Supreme Court. I MCDONNELL V. UNITED STATES: SUPREME COURT DEFINES THE BRIBERY STATUTE'S "OFFICIAL ACT" REQUIREMENT Prosecutors often charge officials with violations of the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951, or with honest services fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1346, by establishing bribery, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 201. 27 To establish bribery, the government must prove that (i) something of value was offered to or received by (ii) an incumbent official or a candidate for office, with the (iii) intent to either "influence any official act" or "be[ ] influenced in the performance of any official act." 28 the prosecution to prove a quid pro quo-that something of value was given in exchange for an official act. 29 parties agreed to define pursuant to the Federal Bribery Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201 as:
[A]ny decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit. 47 Following a five-week trial, the jury found McDonnell guilty. 48 McDonnell filed a motion to vacate the jury verdict and a motion for a new trial, but the district court denied both motions. 49 McDonnell appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the following jury instruction on the meaning of "official act" was erroneous 50 :
The term official action . . . includes those actions that have been clearly established by settled practice as part of a public official's position, even if the action was not taken pursuant to responsibilities explicitly assigned by law. In other words, official actions may include acts that a public official customarily performs, even if those actions are not described in any law, rule, or job description. And a public official need not have actual or final authority over the end result sought by a bribe payor so long as the alleged bribe payor reasonably believes that the public official had influence, power or authority over a means to the end sought by the bribe payor. In addition, official action can include actions taken in furtherance of longer-term goals, and an official action is no less official because it is one in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end. 51 The Court of Appeals found these instructions proper, despite McDonnell's argument that the instructions encompassed ceremonial acts such as receptions and speeches. 52 Appeals also upheld the district court's decision to reject McDonnell's proposed instructions. 53 The Court of Appeals then reviewed the evidence submitted to the jury and concluded that it was sufficient to sustain a conviction. The Court of Appeals first identified three official acts McDonnell performed. First, McDonnell "exploited the power of his office in furtherance of an ongoing effort to influence . . . state university researchers" to study Anatabloc. 54 Second, McDonnell used his influence to urge "the state-created Tobacco Indemnification and Community Revitalization Commission . . . [to] allocate money for the study of anatabine"-the basis of Anatabloc. 55 And third, McDonnell used his influence to urge health department officials to "include Anatabloc as a covered drug" in the health insurance plan for state employees. 56 For each of these acts-the quothe Court of Appeals found a contribution of money or servicethe quid. 57 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that McDonnell "received a fair trial and was duly convicted by a jury of his fellow Virginians." 58 Thereafter, McDonnell petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which the Court granted but limited to the question of whether McDonnell performed an official act. 59 
C. The Supreme Court Disagrees
The Supreme Court began its review by noting that McDonnell's Hobbs Act and honest services fraud convictions depended wholly on the district court's interpretation of "official act." 60 The Government contended that an official act "encompasses nearly any activity by a public official . . . includ [ing] arranging a meeting, contacting another public official, or hosting an event-without more-concerning any subject, including a broad policy issue." 61 Speaking on behalf of a unanimous court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected such an interpretation, holding that "setting up a meeting, calling another public official, or hosting an event does not, standing alone, qualify as 53 See id. at 513 (noting the Governor's proposed instructions that "'[m]any settled practices of government officials are not official acts' . . . [was] not a statement of law . . . [but] a thinly veiled attempt to argue the defense's case"). 54 Id. at 517. 55 Id. at 516. 56 
Id.
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See id. at 518-20. 58 Id. at 520. an 'official act. '" 62 In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court developed a two-part test to determine whether a public official acted officially. First, did the public official's conduct constitute a "formal exercise of governmental power"? 63 Second, did the public official decide a matter that by law is the official's duty to decide, or intentionally influence another official to decide such a matter? 64 According to Chief Justice Roberts, an official act denotes "a formal exercise of governmental power" because 18 U.S.C. § 201 requires an action on a "question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy"-terms traditionally used to refer to "lawsuit[s], hearing [s] , and administrative determination [s] ." 65 Moreover, the statute also requires "that the question or matter . . . be 'pending' or 'may by law be brought' before 'any public official.'" 66 The Court held that the phrase "'may by law be brought' conveys something within the specific duties of an official's position," while the word "'any' conveys that the matter may be pending either before the public official who is performing the official act, or before another public official." 67 Therefore, to prove that a public official performed an official act, the government must demonstrate that the government action that was the object of bribery could normally be requested of some public official by law. 68 Thereafter, the Court set out to determine the conduct that would constitute a "decision or action" on the official matter or question. 69 Here, the Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's interpretation, holding that "the public official must make a deci- 62 Id. at 2368. (for use of these terms within the same statute)). The Chief Justice also noted that while "question" and "matter" could be defined broadly, "the familiar interpretive canon noscitur a sociis, 'a word is known by the company it keeps,'" urged a narrow reading. Id. Moreover, interpreting "question" and "matter" broadly would render the other terms impermissibly superfluous. See id. at 2369 (citing Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 299 n.1 (2006)). 66 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3)). 67 
Id.
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See id. ("Economic development is not naturally described as a matter 'pending' before a public official-or something that may be brought 'by law' before him-any more than 'justice' is pending or may be brought by law before a judge, or 'national security' is pending or may be brought by law before an officer of the Armed Forces."). 69 See id. at 2370. sion or take an action on" an official matter or question, not merely act in a manner "related to a pending question or matter." 70 An official could also be prosecuted for agreeing to perform the official act, even if the official never intended to perform. 71 Nonetheless, "meeting with other officials, or speaking with interested parties is not, standing alone, a 'decision or action.'" 72 That being said, such meetings and parties could "serve as evidence of an agreement to take an official act," if the "official was attempting to pressure or advise another official on a pending matter." 73 What the prosecution must show is that "the public official . . . intend[ed] to exert pressure on another official or provide advice, knowing or intending such advice to form the basis for an 'official act. '" 74 Applying these rules to the facts of the case, the Court found that the jury instructions were inadequate, because it was neither clear that the "jury reached its verdict after finding . . . formal exercise of governmental power," nor that McDonnell "agree[d] to make a decision or take an action on" that formal exercise. 75 In other words, it was unclear whether McDonnell "expected [his subordinates] to do anything other than" attend the meeting; a conviction requires evidence that McDonnell intended to pressure or advise his subordinates to adopt Anatabloc. 76 Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. 77 
D. No Mens Rea, No Corruption
Reactions to the McDonnell decision were quite polarized, with some condemning it as a "decimation of . . . anti-corruption laws" 78 and others dismissing it as unremarkable. 79 In Tawdry or Corrupt?-currently one of the most extensive re- 70 Id.
71
Id. at 2371. 72 Id. at 2370 (citing United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 407 (1999)). 73 Id. at 2371. 74 Id.
75
Id. at 2374-75. 76 See id. 77 Id. at 2375. views of McDonnell-Harvey Silverglate and Emma QuinnJudge assert that the Court's definition of official action is still too ambiguous and "poses grave risks of prosecution without fair notice." 80 According to their article, too fine of a line exists between, for example, "narrowing down the list of potential research topics"-an official act, and "gather[ing] additional information"-not an official act. 81 Silverglate and Quinn-Judge claim that "this very fine distinction . . . disappears completely when the question shifts to performance of an official act," 82 because the jury is permitted to conclude that "the official was attempting to pressure or advise another official on a pending matter." 83 Accordingly, they conclude that the prosecution could hold any official liable "so long as it can find some connection to an official act-be it a 'qualifying step' on the road to a decision or an attempt to exert pressure or offer advice to another official who is performing an official act." 84 The analysis of Silverglate and Quinn-Judge, while appealing at first glance, fails to fully extrapolate the two-part test the Court created. They err in their claim that the prosecution could establish an official act by showing that "the official was attempting to pressure or advise another official on a pending matter." 85 That is, the article confounds three distinct scenarios the Court attempted to keep separate: first, where officials act within their duty; second, where officials attempt to influence other officials in performance of their duty; and third, where officials advise other officials. 86 The elements necessary to prove each of these scenarios differ. First, when an official performs "the function conferred by the authority of his office," the prosecution must prove no more than that the official "agreed to perform . . . at the time of the alleged quid pro quo." 87 Second, when an official "us[es] his official position to exert pressure on another official to perform an 'official act,'" the prosecution must show that the official intended to exert pressure. 88 Third, the official act requirement is established if an official "advise[s] another official, knowing or intending that such advice will form the basis for an 'official act' by another official." 89 In other words, the Court added mens rea requirements for prosecutions arising out of bribes received in exchange for advice or influence, whereas bribes in exchange for an act lack such a requirement.
The Court's addition of a mens rea requirement is not without significance. Lower tribunals generally do not require the prosecution to prove the public official's mental state as to performing the official act, but merely that he or she knew the nature of what he or she was receiving. 90 Mens rea requirements complicate prosecutions, as prosecutors must invest more time and resources to obtain the requisite evidence. 91 This is particularly true in the white-collar crime context, where the presence of many actors diffuses evidence of individual involvement. 92 Furthermore, the intent requirement would also introduce the possibility of mistake of fact as a defense- 87 Id. at 2369, 2371 (noting that for such cases "[t]he jury may consider a broad range of pertinent evidence, including the nature of the transaction, to answer that question"). 88 Id. at 2370, 2371 ("Simply expressing support for the research study at a meeting, event, or call-or sending a subordinate to such a meeting, event, or call-similarly does not qualify as a decision or action on the study, as long as the public official does not intend to exert pressure on another official." (emphasis added)). 89 that a defendant "honestly believed in a set of facts that would prevent him from forming the requisite mens rea." 93 Thus, the Court established additional hurdles the prosecutions would have to overcome in addition to traditional defenses-e.g., entrapment, due process, duress, or coercion 94 -and the defendants' claim that extensive media coverage of their casecorruption cases make front-page headlines 95 -unduly influenced the jurors. 96 This is not to say, however, that by introducing an additional mens rea requirement, the Court has "decimat[ed] . . . anti-corruption laws." 97 The Court is unlikely to require direct evidence of the public official's intent to influence another official, because such a requirement could allow "the law's effects [to] be frustrated by knowing winks and nods." 98 Lower tribunals, therefore, generally permit use of circumstantial evidence to infer intent, particularly where direct evidence is likely to be scanty. 99 Accordingly, courts will almost certainly allow circumstantial evidence to prove the public official's intent to influence another official.
Id. at 2372 (emphasis added
Unfortunately, McDonnell did not address whether the circumstantial evidence in the record was sufficient to establish intent. It remains to be seen, therefore, just how difficult it would be for the prosecution to prove an intent to influence. Hager, supra note 78; see also Wertheimer, supra note 10 ("[T]he Court has substantially weakened the legal protections that currently exist against government corruption."). mitted corruption to be prosecuted as a common law offense. 111 Throughout this ardent war on corruption, Congress and the Court believed corruption could undo governments. Senators believed themselves to be enacting statutes, for example, to preserve the proper "character of the Government" and the honor of public office. 112 Likewise, the Supreme Court harshly decried attempts to influence politicians with gifts and bribes, believing that such conduct would cause "corruption [to] become the normal condition of the body politic." 113 The Court sought to prevent nations to speak "of us as of Rome-'omne Romae venale.'" 114 Similarly, in the campaign finance setting, the Court condemned lobbying as corruption and concluded that its proscription was necessary to maintain public morals. 115 The Court retained this view of campaign finance corruption well into the mid-twentieth century and so granted Congress broad latitude in regulating campaign contributions. In Burroughs v. United States, for example, the Court authorized Congress to "safeguard . . . an election from the improper use of money" and "preserve the departments and institutions of the general government from impairment or destruction, whether threatened by force or by corruption." 116 A broad grant of power was necessary because the Court defined corruption broadly to include the "evil . . . [known as] the use of corporation or union funds to influence the public at large to vote for a particular candidate or a particular party." 117 In other words, any form of campaign contributions was viewed as corrupting and morally deplorable. The only corruption Congress could not tackle was one it had no Constitutional power to reach. 118 During the same time period, the Court defined criminal corruption broadly to encompass any attempt to unduly influ- 127 There, the Supreme Court examined whether Congress could impose limits on contributions and expenditures. 128 Though it upheld contribution limits, 129 the Court declared expenditure limits as burdening "core First Amendment expression." 130 Most relevantly, the Court argued that, unlike direct contributions, expenditures lack "prearrangement and coordination . . . with the candidate or his agent," and this "alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate." 131 The distinguishing factor between contribution limitations and expenditure limitations was, therefore, whether the Court believed that the limitation adequately prevented corruption. Here, however, corruption carried a definition unique to the campaign contribution setting. 132 From this point, campaign finance corruption began to diverge from criminal corruption. The Court still continued to articulate a broad definition of campaign finance corruption. In 1990, the Court upheld Michigan's expenditure regulation not because it addressed the "danger of 'financial quid pro quo' corruption," but because it "aim[ed] at a different type of corruption in the political arena: the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth." 133 tion.'" 134 The Court thus recognized that "in addition to 'quid pro quo arrangements,'" Congress had to address the problems of "'improper influence' and 'opportunities for abuse.'" 135 Based on this broader understanding of corruption, the government had broad power to regulate campaign financing. This language culminated in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, where the Court upheld limitations on campaign contributions and expenditures, stating that Congress had the power to limit "undue influence on an officeholder's judgment, and the appearance of such influence." 136 The definition of criminal corruption, on the other hand, the Court began to narrow. In McCormick v. United States, the Court could not have been more explicit in separating the two areas of law: it reversed a conviction because the jury instructions failed to properly separate voluntary campaign contributions from extortion. 137 Writing for the majority, Justice Byron White defined criminal corruption as excluding favoritism in exchange for campaign contributions:
[T]o hold that legislators commit the federal crime of extortion when they act for the benefit of constituents or support legislation furthering the interests of some of their constituents, shortly before or after campaign contributions are solicited and received from those beneficiaries, is an unrealistic assessment of what Congress could have meant by making it a crime to obtain property from another . . . "under color of official right." 138 Whereas in Brewster such conduct amounted to a crime, Justice White argued in McCormick that this conduct was "the everyday business of a legislator" that has "long been thought to be well within the law [and] hibit campaign contributions that resulted in ingratiation and access because "[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption." 148 Regulation was unconstitutional if it did not target the Court's definition of corruption. 149 This is true even if the regulation was in response to actual corruption. 150 The previously broad understanding of corruption was narrowed significantly in 2014, when Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the plurality in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission, curtailed corruption to quid pro quo arrangements and appearance thereof. 151 "[A]ppearance of corruption," the plurality noted, "'stem[s] from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions' to particular candidates." 152 Nonetheless, federal and state governments could only seek to prevent "the appearance of quid pro quo corruption[-]the Government may not seek to limit the appearance of mere influence or access." 153 Thus limited, the Chief Justice had little trouble dismissing the federal government's claim that aggregate limits on contributions prevented quid pro quo corruption. 154 Just as Justice Kennedy's view of corruption prevailed in the context of campaign finance, so too his view prevailed in criminal law. In 1992, Justice Kennedy earned a spot in the limelight, composing an often-cited concurring opinion in Evans v. United States. 155 There, he explicitly limited an anticorruption statute to quid pro quo corruption and delineated the requisite evidence for proving a quid pro quo. 156 His explanation, however, granted the government broad latitude in proving their case: quid pro quo could be "implied from [the official's] words and actions," to avoid having "the law's effect . . . frustrated by knowing winks and nods." 157 This language led Professor Brown to interpret Justice Kennedy as endorsing 148 Id. at 360. 
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See id. at 274-75 157 Id. at 274. a broad view of corruption, inconsistent with the narrow view advanced in campaign finance cases. 158 While it is true that Justice Kennedy's opinion allowed the prosecution greater latitude in proving its case-at least in non-campaign contribution cases 159 -his definition of corruption did not change from his dissent in Austin. In the concurring opinion in Evans and the dissent in Austin, Justice Kennedy limited corruption to quid pro quo arrangements. 160 In fact, Justice Kennedy explicitly noted in Evans that the rationale behind the requirement for a quid pro quo in campaign contribution cases and in Hobbs Act prosecution cases is the same. 161 Thus, Evans does not stand for a broad view of corruption. The strongest evidence in support of this proposition is the fact that the Justices heralding a narrow view of criminal corruption in Evans-Antonin Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy-later advocated for a narrow view of campaign finance corruption. 162 Thereafter, Justice Kennedy's definition of criminal corruption became mainstream, with a unanimous Court holding that bribery requires "a quid pro quo-a specific intent to give or receive something of value in exchange for an official act." 163 The Court limited criminal corruption to quid pro quo arrangements, noting that prosecution had to prove more than that money was paid for goodwill. 164 The Supreme Court then de- 158 See Brown, Applying Citizens United, supra note 106, at 179. 159 See Gold, supra note 106, at 288 (noting that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit requires explicit agreement to be shown in all cases, while other circuits require this only in the campaign contribution context).
160
Compare Evans, 504 U.S. at 275 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Thus, I agree with the Court, that the quid pro quo requirement is not simply made up."), with Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 703 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that to reach their holding the majority had to invent new forms of corruption because quid pro quo corruption was lacking). 161 See Evans, 504 U.S. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 162 See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 273-74 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that newly recognized form of corruption "is antithetical to everything for which the First Amendment stands"); id. at 248 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that the statute "cut[ ] to the heart of what the First Amendment is meant to protect"); id. at 292 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Buckley made clear, by its express language and its context, that the corruption interest only justifies regulating candidates' and officeholders' receipt of what we can call the 'quids' in the quid pro quo formulation."); see also Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 406 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority improperly expanded Buckley); id. at 422 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the Court had always understood corruption in "the narrow quid pro quo sense"). 163 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of Cal., 526 U.S. 398, 404-05 (1999). 164 See id. at 414.
cided Skilling v. United States. 165 The Skilling Court did not, however, address corruption, holding no more than that the honest services fraud statute covers kickbacks and bribery. 166 After Skilling, Courts of Appeals continue to be divided on whether the definition of corruption in the campaign finance context applies in the criminal corruption context. 167 
D. McDonnell Signals the Impending Demise of the Distinction
Professor Brown ends his survey here, concluding that views of corruption still remain separate and that Citizens United exercises no force outside the campaign finance context. 168 He asserts that a narrow view of corruption has no place in the criminal law context, where "concepts of equality and neutrality reign." 169 Professor Brown's analysis can be challenged in numerous ways. For one, the Court has consistently held that equality and neutrality have no place in politics. 170 See TEACHOUT, supra note 107, at 244 ("Citizens United changed the culture at the same time that it changed the law. It reframed that which was unpatriotic and named it patriotic."); Eisler, supra note 107, at 409 ("The cumulative effect of Citizens United was to strip federal campaign finance regulation to a competitive core."). [ing] to even the most commonplace requests for assistance," and citizens "from participating in democratic discourse." 174 This formulation raises the question of why broad application of a bribery statute, or any other anti-corruption statute, would deter citizens from democratic discourse. That is, if the citizen were merely speaking, there would be no grounds for finding corruption-no quid. Chief Justice Roberts's formulation only makes sense if the citizen engages in democratic discourse with money or other consideration, as in Citizens United. 175 Similarly, anti-corruption statutes would rarely apply to an official's response to a constituent's request for assistance. For example, no one would suspect corruption if a senator were to advocate a bill to assist victims of a natural disaster. Common sense dictates that official acts that benefit the public in general would make for poor prosecutions. Anticorruption statutes are only relevant, therefore, when a public official shows undue favor to an individual or a select group of individuals in exchange for some benefit. Thus explained, the Chief Justice appears concerned that broad bribery statutes would deter citizens from contributing funds in exchange for special treatment. In fact, the Chief Justice labels such exchanges as "participat[ion] in democratic discourse" rather than corruption. 176 Accordingly, Chief Justice Roberts's public policy concern is congruent with Citizens United's First Amendment concern. 177 asserts that "[i]ngratiation and access . . . are not corruption." 178 The McDonnell decision may have profound effect on future anti-corruption efforts. For one, the Court has again proved its commitment to abandoning the anti-corruption values "the framers said they must provide, lest our government will soon be at an end." 179 Additionally, as the McDonnell holding seems to adopt campaign financing law, future defendants may elect to challenge their prosecutions on First Amendment grounds. Thus, lower tribunals may soon be asked to decide the constitutionality of existing anti-corruption statutes. The next Part will address the potential merit of such challenges.
III A LINE DRAWN TOO FAR: A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO CORRUPT YOUR POLITICIAN
The Constitution cannot be used as a shield against charges of "bribery," so long as the term is limited to quid pro quo arrangements as the Supreme Court understands it. But outside the Court, bribery is not defined so narrowly. Dictionaries, for example, define it as money paid "to influence the judgment or conduct" 180 of a politician, or to "persuade (a person, etc.) to act improperly in one's favor." 181 Similarly, the typical student understands bribery as the giving of something of value in exchange for an "unfair advantage." 182 Even legal dictionaries offer a definition broader than the Court's: " [a] price, reward, gift or favor bestowed or promised with a view to pervert the judgment of or influence the action of a person in a position of trust." 183 The guaranties of freedom of expression in effect in 10 of the 14 States which by 1792 had ratified the Constitution, gave no absolute protection for every utterance. Thirteen of the 14 States provided for the prosecution of libel, and all of those States made either blasphemy or profanity, or both, statutory crimes. 185 On the other hand, "ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance . . . have the full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more important interests." 186 Thus, a letter arguably containing threats could not be used to convict an individual if that letter primarily addressed issues of public concern. 187 Moreover, this protection is not limited to verbal speech but extends to expressive speech, such as contributions to political officials. 188 Contributions to political officials, in fact, receive the highest degree of protection because [I] f it be conceded that the First Amendment was "fashioned to assure the unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people," . . . then it can hardly be doubted that the constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office. 189 The First Amendment, thus, protects political association inasmuch as it protects pure speech. 190 
184
Justice Stephen Breyer dismissed the defense's attempt to frame the argument as relating to campaign contribution cases. That the First Amendment protects political association does not mean that it prohibits any regulation of political speech. Congress and the state governments may impose restrictions on political speech so long as a sufficiently important interest is advanced. 191 After McCutcheon, however, "the only interests that can support contribution restrictions" are prevention of "quid pro quo corruption[ ] or its appearance." 192 Now, per McDonnell, gifts to public officials solely in exchange for gratuity or influence do not constitute quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. 193 As gifts in return for gratuity and influence do not constitute corruption, and certainly have "the slightest redeeming social importance," 194 such contributions are likely to enjoy "the full protection of the guaranties" of the First Amendment. 195 In any event, Congress and state governments lack a sufficiently important interest in regulating this type of political speech. 196 Accordingly, the First Amendment could protect the exchange of bribes for influence, favor, and advocacy.
Prior to McDonnell, such a defense never resulted in an acquittal. In United States v. Menendez, for example, the defendants sought to dismiss the charges, citing Citizens United and McCutcheon for the proposition that "the Constitution protects all 'efforts to influence and obtain access to elected officials. '" 197 The New Jersey District Court agreed, but held that such a defense is inapplicable on the given facts. 198 The Me-191 nendez prosecution alleged "a quid pro quo bribery scheme," whereby the defendants "conspired to offer . . . 'things of value to influence official acts benefitting [their] personal and business interests. '" 199 Similarly, in United States v. Halloran, the defendant attempted to argue that Citizens United created "a 'brave new world . . . in which the institutionalized bribery of campaign finance . . . is constitutionally protected,' thus 'blurring . . . the distinction between protected speech and bribery.'" 200 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected such use of the First Amendment, holding that the prosecution properly alleged quid pro quo corruption. 201 There, the jury found that Halloran paid money in exchange for an authorization to seek the nomination of a party the defendant was not a member of-a "Wilson-Pakula." 202 204 On appeal over admissibility of certain documents that would prove the transaction to be merely an exchange of favors, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held any error harmless, because the mere trading of "'public influence' . . . in exchange for" a quid constituted criminal corruption. 205 Nonetheless, a member of the panel, Judge Gilbert Merritt, dissented, arguing that Dimora could not be prosecuted if his conduct amounted to no more than ingratiation and access protected by the First Amendment. 206 According to Judge Merritt, Dimora could have established that his relationships were "of 'ingratiation and access' that may have been deplorable but [were] arguably legal." 207 Thus, prior to McDonnell, the First Amendment defense existed only in theory. 208 199 McDonnell changed things. On July 13, 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the conviction of New York State Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, citing McDonnell v. United States. 209 The prosecution charged Silver with many corrupt schemes. For example, Silver allegedly funneled $500,000 in taxpayer-funded research grants to a doctor in exchange for the doctor steering his patients to Silver's law firm. 210 Silver also met with lobbyists, hosted parties and voted for legislation that benefited real estate developers, allegedly in exchange for the developers' use of a law firm that paid Silver referral fees. 211 Despite finding ample evidence, the Court of Appeals reversed Silver's conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the jury instruction "captured lawful conduct, such as arranging meetings or hosting events with constituents." 212 The jury instructions were overbroad because, post McDonnell, the instructions captured examples of lawful influence peddling. Does the reversal of Silver's conviction spell immediate doom for all anti-corruption efforts? Most likely not. For one, Courts of Appeals appear reluctant to reverse convictions on facts different from McDonnell v. United States. 213 More importantly, the stream of benefits doctrine complicates any First Amendment defense. This doctrine loosens the quid pro quo requirement, allowing conviction "so long as the evidence shows a 'course of conduct of favors and gifts flowing to a public official in exchange for a pattern of official actions favorable to the donor.'" 214 In United States v. Kemp, this doctrine allowed the government to convict executives of a bank for extending loans to a city treasurer in exchange for "get[ting] special treatment." 215 Although the evidence against these executives showed only that they extended loans and received the treasurer's gratitude in return, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the executives' conviction under the stream of benefits doctrine. 216 How is the special treatment the Kemp executives received different from the special treatment Governor McDonnell gave to Williams? 217 The Kemp executives could very well have sought to curry favor and purchase access, which is not illegal. The stream of benefits doctrine can thus turn gifts in exchange for gratitude into quid pro quo corruption. 218 The stream of benefits doctrine is frequently challenged as incompatible with other Supreme Court holdings. Prior to McDonnell, some individuals have unsuccessfully argued that the Supreme Court in Skilling v. United States rejects this doctrine. 219 Although Skilling has failed to undermine the stream of benefits doctrine, McDonnell may succeed in doing so:
The first hint that the stream of benefits theory may no longer be viable is the [McDonnell] Court's requirement of specificity: an "official act" must "be something specific and focused that is 'pending' or 'may by law be brought' before a public official." The next clue is that while Skilling favorably cited cases that endorsed a stream of benefits theory . . . those citations are conspicuously absent from McDonnell. Instead, . . . the Court in McDonnell qualified the quid pro quo requirement as follows: it "need not be explicit, and the public official need not specify the means that he will use to perform his end of the bargain." . . . Thus, although "the means" need not be specified, it appears that "an" official act must be specified. 220 ment may prove to be a viable shield against certain prosecutions, that shield may be shattered easily in courts that choose to endorse the stream of benefits doctrine even beyond McDonnell.
CONCLUSION
On the reading advocated above, McDonnell signals the existence of a First Amendment right to engage in a corrupt "pay to play" culture. 222 This First Amendment right has the potential to challenge nearly every U.S. law that addresses corruption. Consider, for example, a prosecution for receiving an illegal gratuity under 18 U.S.C. § 201(c). Could the defendant in such a trial not assert that she simply received gifts in return for ingratiation and access? Similarly, the First Amendment challenge could apply to other anti-corruption statutes, such as those proscribing compensations to members of Congress, 223 offers of loans or gratuity to financial institution examiners, 224 bribery of sporting contests, 225 and bribery of port security. 226 Interpreted pessimistically, McDonnell might be the key to dismantling the United States's anti-corruption framework. 227 What is to be done about the possible First Amendment right to corruption? We can elect to do nothing, betting on a narrow interpretation of McDonnell. For example, some assert that the Court in McDonnell simply meant to send federal prosecutors a clear message to "stop overreaching in public corruption cases." 228 Alternatively, we may assert that lower tribunals will be reluctant to interpret McDonnell as expansively; they are generally far harsher on corruption than the Supreme Court. 229 District Courts and Courts of Appeals tend to honor broad judicial discretion Congress bestows, interpreting it as a license to prosecute a broad range of corrupt conduct. 230 Thus, although the Supreme Court in McDonnell appeared to condemn prosecutorial and judicial overreach, 231 lower tribunals may continue to resist the narrow definition of corruption-some courts have already distinguished McDonnell on its facts. 232 On the other hand, some lower tribunals may honor the Supreme Court's holdings, thus weakening law enforcement's ability to combat corruption. 233 If, however, we choose to abolish the First Amendment right to corruption, then we must reform our entire anti-corruption framework. Comprehensive reform is necessary for numerous reasons. First, no statute can reverse McDonnell's holding-Congress cannot criminalize the giving of something of value in exchange for influence, favor, and advocacy-because such statute would likely infringe on the First Amendment. 234 Similarly, passing another broad anti-corruption statute would be futile, as the Supreme Court is bound to limit it. 235 Second, a functioning anti-corruption regime requires the government to "operate in an accountable and transparent manner" as well as enforce a comprehensive criminal code. 236 Finally, the origin of the First Amendment right to sell influence, favor, and advocacy lies in Citizens United and McCutcheon. To eliminate this right, it may be necessary "to overturn the Supreme Court's troubling narrow quid pro quo definition of corruption" in the campaign finance setting. 237 This could 229 See Brown, Applying Citizens United, supra note 106, at 221 (noting that lower tribunals have before resisted attempts at weakening the anti-corruption framework set up by Kemp). 
